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Notes
XIN-CHANG ZHANG v. SLATTERY: REJECTING CHINA'S COERCIVE
POPULATION-CONTROL POLICY AS GROUNDS FOR
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
In February 1993, the Golden Venture, a rusty and aged freighter, em-
barked on a 16,000 mile journey from Fujian Province in the People's Re-
public of China (China) to Queens, New York.' Amassed in the ship's
cargo holds were 300 Chinese nationals desperate to flee their homeland
for the sanctity of the United States.2 For them, the ship's departure
marked an end to communist oppression and the beginning of a long and
arduous journey to freedom.
The immigrants lived in squalor for 114 days as the Golden Venture
sailed past Asia, Africa and across the turbulent Atlantic Ocean. 3 Hopeful
of reaching the land of liberty, they endured cramped quarters, unsanitary
conditions and illness with little or nothing to eat.4 Unfortunately for
1. Richard Pyle, Smugglers'Freighter Runs Aground, Seven Chinese Die, AP,June 7,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File; see also Malcolm Gladwell &
Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Alien-Smuggling Ship Runs Aground; Hundreds of Chinese
Swim Onto N.Y. Beach: 7 Die in Frigid Ocean, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at Al
(describing voyage of Golden Venture); Alfred Lubrano, Desperate Hours; Hopes Run
Aground; Chinese Leap from Ship Off Queens; At Least 8 Dead, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1993,
at 3 (describing events following ship's arrival in New York); Manuel Perez-Rivas,
Desperate Hours; Sailing Three Oceans, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1993, at 6 (recounting ship's
voyage).
2. Pyle, supra note 1, at Al; cf. Nancie L. Katz, Asylum Rules Debated as '93
Chinese Refugees Remain Jailed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23, 1995, at 10A (re-
porting 282 passengers were aboard Golden Venture); Lubrano, supra note 1, at 3
(estimating number of Chinese passengers at 330). For a discussion of how the
passengers endured the voyage, see Refugees from Grounded Refugee Ship Interviewed,
UPI,June 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Refugees]
("Despite the stench and the filth in the holds, the human cargo lived on hopes of
attaining a priceless commodity[, freedom].").
3. Pyle, supra note 1, at Al (noting that one passenger marked passing of each
day with scratch on ship's hold); see also Refugees, supra note 2 (discussing living
conditions aboard Golden Venture).
4. Refugees, supra note 2. The cargo hold had only one bathroom for all of the
passengers. Id. The men complained of long lines to use the facilities as the wo-
man bathed. Id. According to one passenger, "Sometimes we would have to uri-
nate on deck." Id.; see also Perez-Rivas, supra note 1, at 6 (according to Emergency
Medical Services technician, food supplies were so limited that "by the end of the
trip, [the passengers] were going after anything they could eat-cats, anything").
According to one refugee woman aboard the Golden Venture, "As each day passed,
we were getting closer to America, and we lived through the difficulties with our
hope." Refugees, supra note 2.
(521)
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some, the long and difficult journey ended in death.5 For others, the
quest for freedom continues. 6
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Golden Venture became the twenty-fourth ship carrying
hundreds of Chinese nationals to reach the United States. 7 Since then, a
steady flow of such vessels continues to approach U.S. waters. 8 Leaders of
the Chinese community in New York estimate that nearly 40,000 Chinese
immigrants have been illegally smuggled into the United States each year
since 1990.9 The driving force behind this influx of immigrants is the
coercive population-control policy strictly enforced by China's communist
government. 10 The policy limits the size of Chinese families to one child
5. Pyle, supra note 1, at Al. According to an Emergency Medical Service tech-
nician present when the Golden Venture ran aground off the coast of Queens, New
York, six people drowned before reaching the beach and two others died later at a
hospital. Id. For a further discussion of the Golden Venture tragedy, see infra notes
124-29 and accompanying text.
6. See Rep. Nudges Clinton on Detainees, YORK DAILY REc., June 21, 1996, at D1
(reporting that of 282 Golden Venture immigrants, 30 were granted asylum, 30 have
been released on bond, 13 juveniles were not detained, 59 remain imprisoned and
remainder were returned to China (citing U.S. Rep. Bill Goodling)); Jack Sherzer,
Chinese Immigrant Update, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Apr. 23, 1996, at A2 (reporting that
approximately 80 Golden Venture immigrants have been granted asylum or released
on bail or parole, 10 were granted asylum in South American countries, 60 were
deported to China, 10 children are in foster care, and remaining are being de-
tained at facilities throughout United States).
7. Pyle, supra note 1, at Al (citing William Slattery, director of Immigration
and Naturalization Service office in New York).
8. Smugglers Send More Chinese Toward U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at A21
(citing senior U.S. diplomat). As of May 1995, U.S. officials were aware of at least
10 smuggling ships approaching the shores of the United States with Chinese im-
migrants aboard. Id.
9. The Immigration in the National Interest Act: Hearings on H.R. 1915 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, International Law and Refugees and Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of David Simcox, Director of Research, Negative
Population Growth, Inc.). The majority of Chinese immigrants come from China's
Fujian Province. Id.
10. Katz, supra note 2, at 10A. Ninety percent of the Golden Venture immi-
grants filed asylum claims based on China's coercive population-control policy. See
also Pyle, supra note 1, at Al ("Many asylum-seekers say they are trying to escape
China's strict population-control policies, which can lead to forced sterilization
and abortions."). But seeJohn Omicinski, How Loophole Allows Chinese to Claim Asy-
lum, Gannett News Service, July 8, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7315958 ("Large
numbers, perhaps the vast majority, of Fujianese stowaways claim protection under
the birth-control policy, only as a convenient ruse.").
Throughout the twentieth century, China's population has grown at an alarm-
ing rate, maintaining its status as the world's most populous nation. Karen Y.
Crabbs, United States Domestic Policies and Chinese Immigrants: Where Should Judges
Draw the Line When Granting Political Asylum?, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 252 (1992)
(noting that China became most populous nation in world during third century
B.C.). By the early 1980s, the population boom reached dynamic proportions as
China became the first nation in the world with over one billion inhabitants. Id. at
252 & n.16 (citing Erika Platte, China's Fertility Transition: The One-Child Campaign,
[Vol. 41: p. 521
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per couple and encourages couples to marry late in life.1 '
57 PAC. AFF. 646 (1984) ("In 1982, China's population, excluding Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao, was reported in a national census to be 1,008,175,288.")). Offi-
cials predict at the end of 1995, 1.212 billion people will inhabit mainland China,
an area only slightly larger than the United States. China Claiming Greater Success in
Controlling Population Growth, AP, Aug. 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4402632
[hereinafter China Claiming Greater Success]. Much of the population growth oc-
curred during the early 1950s, due to Chairman Mao Tse-Tsung's belief that large
families contributed to a more productive labor force. Michael Weisskopf, Shang-
hai's Curse: Too Many Fight For Too Little, Tough Birth Control Policy Shakes Chinese
Society, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Weisskopf, Shanghai's Curse]
(according to Chairman Mao, "every stomach comes with two hands attached").
During the 1950s, China's birth rate soared to 5.87 births per woman. Crabbs,
supra, at 252-53.
By the late 1970s, however, the swollen population began to pose serious
problems as China encountered a serious grain shortage. Id. at 253 & n.21 (citing
Sue Bigelow, Agriculture Reaching Crisis Point, CHINA REV., Aug. 1989, at 23). Faced
with diminishing food supplies and stagnant economic growth, population-control
became a high priority for the Chinese government. Id. at 253. "China's leaders
have made family planning a top national priority. They believe that economic
modernization goals will be unattainable without a low birth rate ...." DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, SUBMITTED TO SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE
COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRAcTICES FOR 1985, at 740 (Comm. Print 1986). In 1982, the Chinese
government adopted Article 25 of the People's Republic of China's Constitution,
which states: "'The state promotes family planning so that population growth may
fit the plans for economic and social development."' James M. Wines, Guo Chun
Di v. Carroll: The Refugee Status of Chinese Nationals Fleeing Persecution Resulting from
China's Coercive Population Control Measures, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 685, 696
& n.96 (1995) (quoting P.R.C. CONST. art. XXV). Under the leadership of Pre-
mier Deng Xiaoping, the communist government implemented a strict popula-
tion-control policy designed to cap China's population at 1.2 billion people by the
year 2000. Michael Weisskopf, Abortion Policy Tears at China's Society, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Weisskopf, Abortion Policy]; Weisskopf, Shanghai's
Curse, supra, at Al (according to General Secretary Hu Yaobang, in September
1982, "[e]xcessive population growth will not only adversely affect the increase of
per capita income but also cause serious difficulties in food supply, housing, edu-
cation and employment, and it may even disrupt social stability"); see also Crabbs,
supra, at 253 (discussing family planning policy).
Statistically, the policy seems to be working. China's birth rate has dropped
from 14.39 births per thousand in 1990 to 12.98 births per thousand in 1995.
China Claiming Greater Success, supra. Regardless, there are still nearly 20 million
new births in China each year. Id.
11. Crabbs, supra note 10, at 253 n.21. Under this policy, procreation is "an
affair of the state," in which human rights are sacrificed for a reduction in China's
population growth. E. Tobin Shiers, Note, Coercive Population Control Policies: An
Illustration of the Need for a Conscientious Objector Provision for Asylum Seekers, 30 VA.J.
INT'L L. 1007, 1011 (1990) (citing Is China's Birth Control Program Still Coercive?:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong. 216 (1987) (state-
ment ofJohn S. Aird, Former Senior Research Specialist on China at U.S. Bureau
of the Census)); see also Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note 10, at Al (discussing
state regulation of family size). According to China's Minister of Family Planning,
Qian Xinzhong, "the size of a family is too important to be left to the personal
decision of a couple. Births are a matter of state planning, just like other economic
and social activities, because they are a matter of strategic concern." Id. (emphasis
added). In 1981, China promoted its "one couple, one child" family planning pol-
icy with the slogan, "late marriage, late childbearing, few births and eugenic
3
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According to the Chinese government, officials enforce the "one
couple, one child" policy through economic incentives and birth control
education only, not through coercive techniques. 12 Despite these assur-
ances, numerous documented cases of forced abortions and sterilizations,
government-sanctioned infanticide and other forms of brutality suggest
that coercion is widespread.13 Furthermore, the economic sanctions im-
births." Crabbs, supra note 10, at 253 n.21 (citing Susan Greenhalgh, The Evolution
of the One-Child Policy in Shaanxi, 1979-88, 122 CHINA Q. 191, 211 (1990)).
The "one couple, one child" policy requires women who become pregnant
after the birth of their first child to abort the pregnancy. Weisskopf, Abortion Policy,
supra note 10, at Al. Following enactment of the policy, the number of abortions
in China skyrocketed. Id. ("[T]he incidence of such operations is stunning-53
million from 1979 to 1984 ... a five-year abortion count approximately equal to
the population of France. In 1983 alone, the number of abortions nationwide-
14.4 million-exceeded the combined populations of the District of Columbia,
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and Delaware.").
12. Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note 10, at Al. According to Weisskopf,
however, the Chinese government plays a much more active role in carrying out its
population-control policy:
What emerges from more than 200 interviews spaced over three years
with officials, doctors, peasants and workers in almost two-thirds of
China's 29 main subdivisions is the story of an all-out government siege
against ancient family traditions and the reproductive habits of a billion
people.
The story offers a glimpse of China usually hidden from foreigners
but painfully familiar to most Chinese-a world of government-sanc-
tioned infanticide, of strongarm sterilizations and of abortions performed
at a rate as high as 800,000 a year in a single province.
Id. Privately, Chinese officials acknowledge that forced abortions and sterilizations
do take place; however, they insist that physical compulsion to submit to such an
operation is not authorized by the Chinese government. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
SUBMITTED TO SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L
RELATIONS, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1994, at 561 (Comm. Print 1995).
13. Shiers, supra note 11, at 1011-16. According to reports, "descriptions
abound of late-night surprise attacks by local officials 'hustling sleeping women
from their beds to 24-hour sterilization clinics."' Id. at 1012 (quoting Weisskopf,
Abortion Policy, supra note 10, at Al); see also Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note
10, at Al ("Expectant mothers, including many in their last trimester, were trussed,
handcuffed, herded into hog cages and delivered by the truckload to the operat-
ing tables of rural clinics, according to eyewitness accounts."). In compliance with
the policy, doctors perform the abortion operations as late as the ninth month of
pregnancy. Id. ("Officials say it often takes that long to get reluctant women to
clinics."); see 135 CONG. Rc. S8244 (daily ed. July 19, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong) (urging colleagues to support Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment on
Asylum for Chinese nationals).
The case of Mrs. Zhou, a Chinese national in the ninth month of her second
pregnancy, illustrates an extreme example of the brutality employed by the Chi-
nese government. Id. In October 1984, the Chinese police burst into her home
and brought her to the hospital for a mandatory abortion. Id. Following a beat-
ing, Mrs. Zhou went into labor en route to the hospital. Id. Although her child
was born alive, it was summarily strangled to death by the accompanying govern-
ment officials. Id. Mrs. Zhou's husband, who witnessed the child's murder, was
subsequently denied asylum in the United States for failing to demonstrate a "well-
founded fear of persecution" based on China's "one couple, one child" policy. Id.;
524
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posed on couples who disregard the "one couple, one child" policy are
often so extreme that couples have no choice but to comply.14 To escape
these coercive population-control measures, thousands of Chinese nation-
als seek asylum in the United States each year.15
This Note focuses on the refusal of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit to grant asylum to a Golden Venture immigrant.
More specifically, Part II of this Note discusses the laws, administrative pro-
nouncements and judicial rulings that led the Second Circuit to deny the
petitioner's request for asylum in Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattey. 16 Part III
presents the facts and procedural history of Xin-Chang Zhang.17 Part IV
analyzes the Second Circuit's reasoning and evaluates the "well-founded
fear of persecution" requirement for asylum as well as the applicability of
various administrative pronouncements regarding Chinese asylum
claims.1 8 Finally, Part V of this Note discusses the possible reverberations
see also Weisskopf, Shanghai's Curse, supra note 10, at Al ("In their zeal to save
China from its reproductive excesses, authorities have resorted to roundups of
pregnant women for abortions, infanticide in city hospitals and sterilization cam-
paigns backed by harsh penalties for resisters.").
14. Shiers, supra note 11, at 1011 ("[T] he severity of economic sanctions for
noncompliance with the policy also constitutes coercion in many areas."); see
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 561. According to
the County Report for 1994,
Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy include fines,
withholding of social services, demotion, and other administrative pun-
ishments, such as loss of employment. Unpaid fines have sometimes re-
sulted in confiscation or destruction of personal property. Because
penalties for excess births can be levied against local officials and the
mothers' work units, many individuals are affected, providing multiple
sources of pressure.
Id.; see also Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, *5-6 (BIA May
12, 1989) (citing DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SUBMrrrED TO SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUN-
TRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, at 666 (Comm. Print 1988)
("Economic pressure on families with more than two children can be severe and
can include loss of party membership, loss of job, difficulty in purchasing state-
supplied seed, fertilizer, and fuel and other sanctions.")).
15. For a further discussion on the number of Chinese immigrants smuggled
into the United States each year, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Asylum
is defined as the following: "A sanctuary, or place of refuge and protection, where
criminals and debtors found shelter, and from which they could not be taken with-
out sacrilege. Shelter; refuge; protection from the hand of justice . BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 124 (6th ed. 1990). Additionally,
An alien may be considered for asylum or refugee status in the United States if the
alien has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her home country. To be
eligible for either asylum or refugee status, the applicant must qualify as a
refugee, as defined by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (42).
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra, at 124 (emphasis added).
16. 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996). For a
discussion of asylum law generally, see infra notes 20-116 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the facts governing the Xin-Chang Zhang opinion, see
infra notes 117-41 and accompanying text.
18. For an analysis of the Second Circuit's reasoning in Xin-Chang Zhang v.
Slattery, see infra notes 142-204 and accompanying text.
1996] NOTE
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of the Second Circuit's holding in Xin-Chang Zhang throughout the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches of the United States federal govern-
ment and suggests that this unsettled area of asylum law stands at an
important crossroad.1 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Governing Asylum Law
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA),20 a comprehensive piece of immigration legislation designed to
regulate the flow of legal and illegal immigrants into the United States. 21
Under the INA, the Attorney General of the United States has the discre-
tion to grant asylum to aliens22 that qualify as "refugees."2 3
In asylum proceedings, the applicant must prove that he or she quali-
fies as a refugee under the INA and is therefore eligible for asylum.24 To
19. For a discussion of the impact of the Second Circuit's decision in Xin-
Chang Zhang, see infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
20. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994)).
21. Id. Congress later enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
94 Stat. 102 (1980), which "significantly amended the INA and establishe[d] the
current statutory framework for evaluating asylum applications." Stanford M. Lin,
China's One-Couple, One-Child Family Planning Policy as Grounds for Granting Asylum,
36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 231, 234 (1995) (discussing district court's decision in Xin-
Chang Zhang v. Slattey, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996)).
22. An alien is defined as
a foreign born person who has not qualified as a citizen of the country;
but an alien is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process clause of the U.S. Constitution to same extent as a citi-
zen. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 .... Any person not a citizen or
national of the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101.
BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 71 (6th ed. 1990).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) ("[T]he alien may be granted asylum in the discretion
of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section [1] 101 (a) (42) (A) of this title."); see also INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1987) (discussing Attorney General's
role in asylum process). In Cardoza-Fonseca, the United States Supreme Court said:
It is important to note that the Attorney General is not required to grant
asylum to everyone who meets the definition of refugee. Instead, a find-
ing that an alien is a refugee does no more than establish that "the alien
may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney GeneraL"
Id. at 428 n.5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)).
24. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(a) (1996) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for
asylum to establish that he is a refugee as defined in section 101 (a) (42) of the
(INA]."); see also Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1995)
("In order to establish asylum eligibility, the applicant must demonstrate that
[China] selectively enforced its population control policy against the applicant
..... " (emphasis added)); Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d 441, 448 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that alien bears burden of proving persecution) (citations omitted)); Jia-
Hu Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1482 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that bur-
den of proof "rests on the applicant"); Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814,
820 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he asylum-seeker bears the burden of proof under the
[Vol. 41: p. 521
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attain refugee status, the applicant must demonstrate a "well-founded
fear" of future persecution (if returned to their native land) based on
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion.2 5 Generally, applicants fleeing China's "one couple,
one child" policy assert fear of persecution because of their political opin-
ions.26 Therefore, courts faced with these asylum applications must deter-
mine whether a refusal to submit to a government levied population-
control policy qualifies as an expression of political opinion under the
INA.
B. Ruling of the BIA in Matter of Chang
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 2 7 first confronted asylum
claims based upon China's coercive "one couple, one child" policy in Mat-
ter of Chang.2 8 Mr. Chang, the respondent, filed applications for asylum,
voluntary departure and withholding of deportation in the United States
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General .... " (citing 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.13(a)), 242.17(e) (1995)); 8 C.F.R § 242.17(e) (1996) ("The respondent
shall have the burden of establishing that he is eligible for any requested benefit or
privilege and that it should be granted in the exercise of discretion.").
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A). The INA defines a "refugee" as: "[A] ny per-
son who is outside any country of such person's nationality... and who is unable
or unwilling to return to... that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion .... " Id.; see also Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d
at 1336 (requiring "well-founded fear" of persecution based on one of five catego-
ries enumerated in INA); Saleh v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 962 F.2d 234, 238-
39 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying INA requirement of persecution based on one of five
enumerated categories to petitioner's claim); Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp.
397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (analyzing claim in light of categories enumerated in
INA); Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 820; Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 711-12;
Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 871 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same), rev'd sub
nom. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).
26. See Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 823 (asserting past persecution on ac-
count of "actual political beliefs or imputed beliefs"); Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at
872 ("The heart of petitioner's asylum claim is the contention that his opposition
to [China's] coercive population control policies constitutes a 'political opinion'
within the meaning of [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A)]."). For a discussion of China's
"one couple, one child" population control policy, see supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (a) (1) (1996). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a
branch of the Department ofJustice composed of a Chair and eleven other mem-
bers. Id. At the discretion of the BIA's Chair, the members are divided into three-
member panels "empowered to review cases by majority vote." Id. The BIA has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the following proceedings: "(1) Decisions of Im-
migration Judges in exclusion cases .... (2) Decisions of Immigration Judges in
deportation cases .... (9) Decisions of Asylum Officers of the [INS] on applica-
tions for asylum or withholding of deportation filed by alien crewman or
stowaways, as provided in § 253.1(f)(4) of this chapter." Id. § 3.1(b). Section
253.1(f)(4) provides: "A decision denying asylum to an alien crewman or
stowaway, but not an alien temporarily excluded under section 235(c) of this chap-
ter, may be appealed directly to the [BIA]." Id. § 253.1(f)(4).
28. Int. Dec. No. 3107, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13 (BIA May 12, 1989).
7
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because he opposed China's "one couple, one child" policy.2 9 In Chang,
the BIA reached two important conclusions regarding China's population-
control policy that subsequently became imbedded in asylum case law.
8 0
First, the BIA concluded that the "'one couple, one child' policy of
the Chinese Government [was not] on its face persecutive."3 1 According
to the BIA, officials implemented the policy to control China's population
growth, not "as a guise for acting against people. 32 Therefore, the BIA
concluded that application of the policy did not create a "well-founded
fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular group or political opinion as required by the INA.33
29. Chang, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, at *2-3. According to Mr. Chang, he fled to
the United States because "[he and his wife] had two children and did not agree to
stop having more children." Id. at *3. Mr. Chang testified at his deportation hear-
ing that the Chinese government insisted that he undergo sterilization and that if
he returned to China, he would be forced to do so. Id. The immigration judge
denied his applications. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *10-11 (concluding that China's population-control policy was not
on its face persecutive or selectively applied). See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at
1342 (concluding that "the [BIA's] interpretation of the asylum statute in Matter of
Chang is entitled to deference"); Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379, 380 (5th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("[T]he criteria defined in Matter of Chang and Matter of G
for use in Chinese forced abortion/forced sterilization asylum claims ... are
neither arbitrary nor capricious and are well within the discretion vested in the
Attorney General by the Act."); Shan Ming Wang v. Slattery, 877 F. Supp. 133, 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (relying on BIA's decision in Changas "valid precedent"); Jia-Ging
Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that BIA's deci-
sion in Chang deserves "considerable deference"), affd, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996);
Shan Qi Lan v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (relying on Chang
as controlling precedent); Jia-Hu Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1483 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) ("Chang stands as binding precedent on immigration judges and the
BIA, and the BIA properly affirmed the immigration judge's reliance on the deci-
sion in the instant case."); Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (relying on BIA's decision in Chang to affirm petitioner's denial of asylum);
Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 823 (relying on BIA's decision in Chang as "re-
main[ing] in effect and serv[ing] as precedent"). For a further discussion of the
judicial deference given to the BIA's decision in Chang, see infra notes 62-114 and
accompanying text.
31. Chang, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, at *10. In reaching this conclusion, the BIA
noted that the continued growth of China's population forced Chinese policy-mak-
ers to take steps to discourage births. Id. The BIA noted that:
Chinese policymakers are faced with the difficulty of providing for
China's vast population in good years and in bad. The Government is
concerned not only with the ability of its citizens to survive, but also with
their housing, education, medical services, and the other benefits of life
that persons in many other societies take for granted.
Id. According to the BIA, "[f]or China to fail to take steps to prevent births might
well mean that many millions of people would be condemned to, at best, the most
marginal existence." Id.
32. Id. at *11. According to the BIA, "one cannot demonstrate that it is a
persecutive measure simply with evidence that it is applied to all persons, including
those who do not agree with it." Id. at *12.
33. Id. at *11 ("[W]e cannot find that persons who do not wish to have the
policy applied to them are victims of persecution or have a well-founded fear of
persecution within the present scope of the Act.").
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Second, the BIA concluded that individuals claiming persecution
under the "one couple, one child" policy must demonstrate that the gov-
ernment has applied the policy "selectively ... to punish individuals for
their political opinions" or for other reasons enumerated under section
1101 (a) (42) (A) of the INA.34 The BIA concluded that there must be evi-
dence of government-sanctioned punishment for the applicant's opinion
rather than punishment in furtherance of a national policy such as popu-
lation-control.35 Therefore, the BIA refused to consider Mr. Chang a vic-
tim of persecution or find that he had a "well-founded fear of persecution"
within the scope of the INA.3 6
C. Administrative Actions in Opposition to Chang
From 1988 to 1993, both the executive and legislative branches of the
United States federal government took definite steps to advance the asy-
lum claims of Chinese aliens.3 7 For example, on August 5, 1988, Attorney
General Edwin Meese issued the first of many administrative pronounce-
ments designed to loosen the asylum requirements for aliens claiming per-
34. Id. According to the BIA, the "one couple, one child" policy did not selec-
tively persecute Mr. Chang on account of his race, religion, membership in a social
group or political opinion as required by section 1101 (a) (42) (A) of the INA. Id. at
*12. Instead, the Chinese government applied the policy to all Chinese nationals
for purposes of population-control. Id. at *10.
35. Id. at *12; see also Saleh v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 962 F.2d 234, 239
(2d Cir. 1992) ("Punishment for violation of a generally applicable criminal law is
not persecution."); MacCaud v. INS, 500 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding
that punishment for non-political crimes does not warrant asylum in United
States); Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that punish-
ment following commission of crime is generally not persecution); OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 15 (1979) ("Persecution must be
distinguished from punishment for a common law offense. Persons fleeing from
prosecution or punishment for such an offense are not normally refugees. It
should be recalled that a refugee is a victim-or potential victim-of injustice, not
a fugitive from justice.").
36. Chang, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, at *15. As a result, the BIA dismissed Mr.
Chang's applications for asylum and withholding of departure. Id. at *16. The
BIA, however, did grant Mr. Chang the opportunity to depart voluntarily instead of
being deported. Id.
37. For an overview of the regulatory history surrounding the asylum claims
of Chinese aliens asserting a well-founded fear of persecution based on China's
"one couple, one child" policy, see Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1335-
38 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing administrative and legislative actions); Shu-Hao
Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
1995) (same); Dai Xiu Ying v. Caplinger, Nos. CIVA.94-2190, 94-2191, 94-2193, 94-
2194, 94-2195, 94-2197, 94-2198, 94-2199, 94-2201, 94-2202, 94-2203, 94-3407, 1995
WL 143830, at *2-8 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 1995) (same); Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery, 864 F.
Supp. 397, 401-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp.
814, 815-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858,
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secution under China's "one couple, one child" policy.3 8 In a series of
guidelines issued to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), At-
torney General Meese stated that "all INS asylum adjudicators are to give
careful consideration to applications from nationals of the People's Re-
public of China who express a fear of persecution upon return to [China]
because they refuse to abort a pregnancy or resist sterilization after the
birth of a second or subsequent child."3 9 Although the guidelines were
properly promulgated, the BIA refused to apply them in Chang, conclud-
ing instead that they "were directed to the [INS], rather than the immigra-
tion judges and this Board."4°
In response to the BIA's decision in Chang and the 1989 student up-
risings in Tiananmen Square, 4 1 Congress enacted the Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief Act of 1989 ("Relief Act"). 42 The Relief Act contained
a provision drafted specifically to overrule the Chang decision. 43 Although
38. See, e.g., Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 815-18 (discussing administrative
pronouncements surrounding asylum claims).
39. Memorandum from the Office of Attorney General Edwin Meese to INS
Commissioner Alan Nelson 1 (Aug. 5, 1988), reprinted in Appellee's Brief at Al,
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-6258). According
to Meese, aliens forced to submit to these procedures qualified for refugee status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) and were therefore entitled to political asylum in
the United States. Id.
40. Chang, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, at *9 (citations omitted); see also C/hen Zhou
Cha, 48 F.3d at 1331, 1338 (rejecting petitioner's claim that BIA erred in applying
Chang to his claim for asylum); Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379, 380 (5th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (upholding BIA's refusal to grant asylum based on previ-
ous ruling in Chang); Jia-Ging Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(concluding that "Chang is still in force, and is deserving of considerable defer-
ence"), affd, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996); Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 823 (uphold-
ing BIA's decision in Chang).
41. Liberty Statue Rallies Chinese Students, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 30,
1989, at 1. After weeks of regular protest rallies in China's capital city, pro-democ-
racy demonstrators, composed primarily of students and workers, began to gather
in Tiananmen Square on May 13, 1989. Id. On June 4, tens of thousands of Chi-
nese troops carrying submachine guns that had surrounded the square moved in
to retake the square. Nicholas D. Kristof, Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and
Crush Beijing Protest; Thousands Fight Back, Scores are Killed, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1989,
at 1. In their efforts to disperse the demonstrators, hundreds were killed. Id. Ac-
cording to reports, "most of the dead had been shot, but some had been run over
by armored personnel carriers that forced their way through barricades erected by
local residents." Id.
42. Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 ("Relief Act"), H.R.
2712, 101st Cong. (1989); see also C/hen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1336 (discussing Relief
Act).
43. Chen Zhou Cha, 48 F.3d at 1336 ("Soon after the [BIA] issued its opinion
in Matter of Chang, Congress began considering legislation to overturn it."); Xiu
Qn C/ en, 862 F. Supp. at 816 ("Congress reacted to the BIA decision by adding an
amendment which would have overruled Chang to the [Relief Act]."); Guo Chun
Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub nom Guo Chun Di v.
Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Soon after the May 1989 Chang decision,
efforts were made in Congress to overturn it. These efforts culminated in the Arm-
strong-DeConcini Amendment to the [Relief Act], H.R. 2712, which was drafted
and offered for the express purpose of overruling Chang.").
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Congress passed the Relief Act with widespread bi-partisan support,44 Pres-
ident George Bush vetoed the bill to "preserv[e] [his] ability to manage
foreign relations."4 5
Despite his veto of the Relief Act, President Bush promised executive
action to "accomplish the laudable objectives of Congress."" At the Presi-
dent's urging, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh promulgated the
January 1990 Interim Rule which granted asylum to aliens with "'a well-
founded fear that they will be required.., to be sterilized because of their
country's family planning policies.., on account of political opinion.'"47
Furthermore, on April 11, 1990, President Bush issued Executive Order
12,711, which directed the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to
extend "enhanced consideration" to immigrants seeking political asylum
due to China's population-control policy.48 On July 27, 1990, however,
Attorney General Thornburgh published a final rule revising the regula-
Senator Armstrong, on behalf of himself and Senators DeConcini, Coats, Mc-
Clure, Humphrey and Helms, proposed the amendment on July 19, 1989. 135
CONG. REc. S8241-42 (July 19, 1989). The Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment pro-
vided that: "[R]efusal to abort or to be sterilized [under China's population con-
trol directives], shall be viewed as an act of political defiance justifying a 'well-
founded fear of persecution' sufficient to establish refugee status under paragraph
42(A) ... of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Id. (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (42) (A)).
44. The Senate passed the Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment unanimously.
Appellee's Brief at 26, Xin-Chang Zhang (No. 94-6258) (citing 135 CONG. REC.
S8241-55 (daily ed. July 19 and 20, 1989)). The House of Representatives voted to
concur by a vote of 300-115. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REc. H7945-54 (daily ed. Nov. 2,
1989)).
45. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration
Relief Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1853, 1854 (Nov. 30, 1989) [here-
inafter Memorandum of Disapproval]. President Bush vetoed the Relief Act be-
cause he felt that it "infringed" on his foreign policy powers. Appellee's Brief at
26, Xin-Chang Zhang (No. 94-6258). The House of Representatives overrode Presi-
dent Bush's veto by a vote of 390-25. Id. The Senate's override, however, fell short
by five votes. Id.
46. Memorandum of Disapproval, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc., at 1853-54
(directing that "enhanced consideration be provided under the immigration laws
for individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to
their country related to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced
sterilization").
47. Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 863 (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805
(1990)) (alterations in original). The January 1990 Interim Rule also amended
the existing asylum regulations to provide that:
"An applicant who establishes that the applicant (or the applicant's
spouse) has refused ... to be sterilized in violation of a country's family
planning policy, and who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be
required.., to be sterilized or otherwise persecuted if the applicant were
returned to such country may be granted asylum."
Id. (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. at 2805) (alterations in original).
48. Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990). The order states:
The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are directed to provide
for enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for individuals
from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their
country related to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced
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tions pertaining to asylum and withholding of deportation claims. 49 Sur-
prisingly, the language contained in the July 1990 Final Rule made no
reference to asylum claims based on coercive family planning or even to
the January 1990 Interim Rule. In Guo Chun Di v. Carroll,50 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia commented that
"theJanuary 1990 Interim Rule had quite simply and remarkably vanished
without a trace or explanation."5 1 Despite the disappearance of the lan-
guage in the January 1990 Interim Rule, the INS continued to consider
coercive family planning policies as a sufficient grounds for asylum "on
account of political opinion."5 2
Nearly two years after its disappearance, the pro-asylum language of
the January 1990 Interim Rule reappeared in a final rule issued by Attor-
ney General William Barr at the close of the Bush administration. 53 Like
the previous rule, the January 1993 Final Rule provided for asylum based
on opposition to coercive family planning policies.5 4 Furthermore, the
sterilization, as implemented by the Attorney General's regulation effec-
tive January 29, 1990.
Id. President Bush issued the order to "underscor[e] the substance of the January
1990 Interim Rule." Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 863.
49. 55 Fed. Reg. 30674 (1990).
50. 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato,
66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).
51. Id. at 864.
52. Memorandum from the General Counsel of the INS, 69 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 311, 311-13 (Mar. 9, 1992). In a memorandum from the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the INS to Regional Counsel and District Counsel, GroverJoseph
Rees III stated:
Department of Justice and INS policy with respect to aliens claiming asy-
lum or withholding of deportation based upon coercive family planning
policies is that the application of such coercive policies does constitute
persecution on account of political opinion. This policy is embodied in
the Attorney General's directives of August 5, 1988 and December 1,
1989; in the President's directive of November 30, 1989; in Executive Or-
der No. 12711 .... and in the interim final regulations published on
January 29, 1990 ....
Id. at 311 (citations omitted); see also Memorandum from David M. Dixon, Appel-
late Counsel, INS, to David B. Holmes, Chief Attorney Examiner, BIA (Apr. 11,
1991) (discussing asylum policy), reprinted in Respondent's Brief at A2, Xin-Chang
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-6258).
53. See Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1337 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The
language of the January 22, 1993 [final] rule essentially reiterated the January 29,
1990 interim rule."); Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 817 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (noting similarity between January 1990 Interim Rule and January 1993 Fi-
nal Rule); Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 864 (concluding that January 1993 Final
Rule essentially reiterated January 1990 Interim Rule).
54. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1337. The January 1993 Final Rule provided
that an applicant qualified for refugee status on account of his or her political
opinion if the applicant could establish that:
[P]ursuant to the implementation by the country of the applicant's na-
tionality or last habitual residence of a family planning policy that in-
volves or results in forced abortion or coerced sterilization, the applicant
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo sterilization or has
[Vol. 41: p. 521
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rule's stated intent was "to supersede the [BIA's] decision in Matter of
Chang.''5 5 The rule stipulated that it became effective upon publication in
the Federal Register, which the Bush administration scheduled for January
25, 1993.56 On January 22, 1993, however, as one of his first official acts,
President Bill Clinton blocked from publication all of the rules issued by
the previous administration not yet published in the Federal Register.
57
Confused by the effect of Executive Order 12,711 and other adminis-
trative pronouncements on its decision in Chang, the BIA petitioned Janet
Reno, the new Attorney General, for review of two of its decisions concern-
ing Chinese asylum claims.58 In a rather vague response, Attorney Gen-
eral Reno indicated that the BIA conclusions in these decisions did not
"require a determination that [either Executive Order 12,711 or Chang] is
lawful and binding."59 Therefore, Attorney General Reno did little to clar-
ify the existing policy concerning Chinese asylum claims.
In sum, between 1988 and 1993, the executive branch of the federal
government issued nine separate pronouncements concerning Chinese
asylum claims based on opposition to China's "one couple, one child" pol-
icy.60 Reproduced below is a chart compiled by Judge Ellis of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia which lists each of
the conflicting pronouncements and their affect on asylum eligibility.
6 1
been persecuted for failure or refusal to do so, and that the applicant is
unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of such persecution.
Xiu Qjn Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 817 (citing January 1993 Final Rule). The January
1993 Final Rule also grants refugee status to applicants establishing a "well-
founded fear [that] ... the applicant will be forced to abort a pregnancy or un-
dergo sterilization or will be persecuted for failure or refusal to do so." Id. at 817-
18.
55. Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 817; Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 858.
56. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1337. The text of the rule stated: "'EFFECTIVE
DATE: [insert date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER].' Xiu Qin Chen,
862 F. Supp. at 822 (quoting January 1993 Final Rule).
57. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1338. President Clinton had the rules with-
drawn from publication so that his "appointees could review and approve the new
regulations." Id. (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (1993)). Included in the unpublished
rules was the January 1993 Final Rule issued and signed by Attorney General Barr
at the close of the Bush administration. To date, the January 1993 Final Rule re-
mains unpublished in the Federal Register.
58. Id. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1), the BIA asked Attorney General Ja-
net Reno to review its decisions in Matter of Chu and Matter of Tsun. Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1) (1993) which states: "The Board shall refer to the Attorney
General for review of its decision all cases which .... The Chairman or a majority
of the Board believes should be referred to the Attorney General for review.").
59. Attorney General Order No. 1756-93 (June 29, 1993).
60. For a further discussion of the administrative pronouncements, see supra
notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
61. Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 866-67 (E.D. Va. 1994) (discuss-
ing conflicting pronouncements), rev'd sub nom. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d
315 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Tara A. Moriarty, Comment, Guo v. Carroll: Political
Opinion, Persecution, and Coercive Population Control in the People's Republic of China, 8
GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 469, 472 (1994) (citing Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 866-67). In
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When faced with Chinese asylum claims, courts must reconcile the admin-
istrative pronouncements permitting asylum with the BIA's refusal to
grant asylum in Chang.
Pronouncement
1. August 5, 1988 Guidelines
promulgated by then Attorney
General Edwin Meese
2. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107
(BIA May, 1989)
3. January, 1990 Interim Rule
promulgated by then Attorney
General Richard Thornburg
[sic]
4. Executive Order No. 12,711,
55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990),
issued by President George
Bush
5. July, 1990 [Final] Rule
6. November, 1991 Memorandum
from the General Counsel of
the I.N.S.
7. January 1993 [Final] Rule
promulgated by then Attorney
General William Barr
8. Matter of Chu, A 71 824 281
(BIA June 7, 1993), Matter of
Tsun, A 71 824 320 (BIA June
7, 1993), and Matter of G-, A 72
761 974 (BIA Dec. 8, 1993)










coercive family planning practices




declined to address conflicting
views on Chang and Executive
Order 12,711
D. Relevant Case Law
1. Courts Giving Deference to Chang
A vast majority of courts contend that the various administrative and
legislative pronouncements issued from 1988 to 1993 failed to effectively
Guo Chun D4 the district court characterized the pronouncements as "an adminis-
trative cacophony undeserving ofjudicial deference." Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at
867.
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overrule or supersede the BIA's decision in Chang.62 When considering
asylum claims, most courts begin their opinions with an analysis of the
applicability of each pronouncement.63
First, courts following Chang generally have concluded that the July
1990 Final Rule, which made no mention of political asylum for oppo-
nents of China's "one couple, one child" policy, effectively superseded the
January 1990 Interim Rule.6 For example, in Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,65
the petitioner argued that the July 1990 Final Rule did not revoke the
January 1990 Interim Rule because "there was no notice or consideration
of the revocation." 6 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument, however, concluding that an exception to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived the requirement of notice
and comment.6 7 The Chen Zhou Chai court concluded that the January
62. Guo Chun Di, 66 F.3d at 317; Chen Zhou Chai 48 F.3d at 1340; Chang Lian
Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 1995); Jia-Ging Dong v. Slattery, 870 F.
Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996); Peng-Fei Si v. Slat-
tery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp.
814, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
63. See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1335-38 (analyzing applicability of each
pronouncement); Peng-Fei Si, 864 F. Supp. at 400-04 (same); Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F.
Supp. at 815-18 (same); Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 862-65 (same).
64. See Chen Zhou Ciai, 48 F.3d at 1340 (concluding that 'January 29, 1990
interim rule is unenforceable because it was revoked by the July 27, 1990 final
rule"); Dai Xiu Ying v. Caplinger, Nos. CIVA.94-2190, 94-2191, 94-2193, 94-2194,
94-2195, 94-2197, 94-2198, 94-2199, 94-2201, 94-2202, 94-2203, 94-3407, 1995 WL
143830, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) ("Because the interim rule was superseded
by the 1990 final rule, petitioners' reliance on [the January 1990 Interim Rule] is
both unpersuasive and inaccurate."); Peng-Fei Si, 864 F. Supp. at 401 ("Si cannot
rely on the 1990 Interim Regulations which were effectively revoked by their omis-
sion from the final regulations issued in July of 1990."); Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp.
at 817 ("The result of the July 1990 Final Rule was effectively to eliminate the
January 1990 Interim Rule without explanation."). But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) ("[T]he revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different than a
failure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views as to
the proper course."); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (concluding that agencies cannot repeal rules by omission).
65. 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995).
66. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1340. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
requires notice of a proposed rule be published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(b),(c) (1994). According to the APA, "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule
making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto
are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law." Id. § 553(b).
Furthermore, the APA requires that proposed agency rules undergo a com-
ment period. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). The APA states: "After notice required by this
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation." Id.
67. Chen Zhou C/ai/ 48 F.3d at 1340-41. The APA does not apply the notice
and comment requirement in three circumstances. First, rules are exempt from
the notice and comment requirement when the rule involves military or foreign
affairs. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1); seeNademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 1982)
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1990 Interim Rule "was a general statement of policy and therefore ex-
empt from the notice and comment requirement."6 8 Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit noted that Attorney General Thornburgh issued the Janu-
ary 1990 Interim Rule without providing for a notice and comment pe-
riod.69 Therefore, if considered substantive, the January 1990 Interim
Rule was never valid under the APA.70
Second, numerous courts have rejected the notion that Executive Or-
der 12,711 prevents the BIA from applying Chang as controlling prece-
dent.71 According to these courts, an executive order does not create a
private right of action unless that was the specific intent of the order.
72
Therefore, several courts have held that President Bush's Executive Order
12,711 did not create a private right enforceable by civil action. 73 Instead,
(finding that foreign affairs exception to APA applied to regulation limiting grant
of voluntary departure to 15 days for Iranian nationals); Malek-Marzban v. INS,
653 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356,
1360-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that regulation regarding Iranian nationals was
response to Iranian hostage crisis and was therefore exempt from the APA's notice
and comment requirement under foreign affairs exception). Second, a rule is ex-
empt from the notice and comment requirement when it is interpretative, proce-
dural or a general statement of policy. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (A); see United States
v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1995) ("'A rule is interpretive ... if it attempts
to clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law, policy, or practice."'
(citations omitted)). Third, a rule is exempt from the notice and comment re-
quirement when the agency has "good cause" to reject the notice and comment
period. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (B); see also National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Ken-
nedy, 572 F.2d 377, 384 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing "good cause" exception to
APA's notice and comment requirement).
68. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1341 (4th Cir. 1995).
69. Id. at 1341 n.9.
70. Id.
71. See Shan Ming Wang v. Slattery, 877 F. Supp. 133, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that Executive Order 12,711 did not overrule BIA's decision in Chang);
Shon Qi Lan v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Jia-Hu
Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Chen Chaun Fei
v. Carroll, 866 F. Supp. 283, 287 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same); Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery, 864
F. Supp 397, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp.
814, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
72. See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1339 ("[Ain executive order is privately
enforceable only if it was intended to create a private cause of action." (citing
Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975))).
73. Id. at 1338 ("As a general rule, 'there is no private right of action to en-
force obligations imposed on executive branch officials by executive orders."'
(quoting Facchiano Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210
(3d Cir. 1993))); Xiu qn Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 822 ("[Ain Executive Order may
not be enforced by a private party where no private right of action is created."
(citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1992))); see
also United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv. v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 844 F.2d 1087, 1095 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that executive branch "has
no power to make the law; that power rests exclusively with Congress"); In re Sur-
face Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding
that executive orders must be grounded in congressional action to be enforceable
by private citizens); Independent Meat Packers Ass'n, 526 F.2d at 236 (concluding that
creation of private action requires appellees to show "that the Order has the force
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these courts have concluded that the executive order merely directed the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to provide "enhanced consid-
eration" to Chinese asylum claims.
74
Third, courts have rejected the applicability of the January 1993 Final
Rule because it was never published in the Federal Register.75 For example,
in Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery,7 6 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the argument that the January 1993 Final
Rule effectively overruled Chang despite its failure to be published in the
Federal Register.77 According to the Peng-Fei Si court, the asserted excep-
tions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cannot be used to bind
an agency to a regulation withdrawn from publication.7 8 Therefore, the
Peng-Fei Si court concluded that there was no support for the "proposition
that an agency is bound to follow a rule that it has never before followed
and that it in fact withdrew from publication, and thereby affirmatively
decided not to adopt."79
In addition to rejecting the applicability of the above pronounce-
ments, courts confronted with asylum claims generally have refused to rec-
ognize opposition to a population-control policy as an expression of
"political opinion."8 0 In Chen Zhou Chai, for example, the petitioner
and effect of law... [and] that it was intended to create a private right of action");
Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that if
statutory or regulatory source of executive order remains silent, no private right of
action can be inferred).
74. See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1339. According to the Fourth Circuit
in Chen Zhou Chai, "[a] court should not enforce an executive order intended for
the internal management of the President's cabinet." Id. (citing United States Dep't
of Health, 844 F.2d at 1095). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit described the order
as "an internal directive from the President to his Attorney General, instructing
him to exercise his statutory authority." Id.; see also Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d
176, 187 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that executive order was not intended to
create any private right of civil action). Similarly, in Independent Meat Packers Ass'n,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[e]ven if appellees could show that the Order
has the force and effect of law, they would still have to demonstrate that it was
intended to create a private right of action." Independent Meat Packers Ass'n, 526
F.2d at 236.
75. Peng-Fei Si, 864 F. Supp. at 397; Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 814; see also
Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1331 (dismissing January 1993 Final Rule because not
published in Federal Register).
76. 864 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
77. Id. at 402-05. The court observed that "not only were the 1993 Regula-
tions never published . . . they were affirmatively withdrawn from publication by
the Acting Attorney General." Id. at 403. The court further noted that the 1993
Regulations "have never been followed by the BIA and thus cannot be regarded as
a policy or procedure of the agency." Id. at 404.
78. Id. at 404-05; see also Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 822 ("The publication
requirement of the Freedom of Information Act is intended to prevent an agency
from enforcement of a rule without notice, not to bind an agency to rules never
enforced.").
79. Peng-Fei Si, 864 F. Supp. at 404.
80. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, *10-11 (BIA May
12, 1989) ("We cannot find that implementation of the 'one couple, one child'
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sought review of a BIA decision that denied his application for asylum in
the United States.8 1 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petitioner's motion,
holding that Mr. Chen Zhou Chai failed to demonstrate persecution on
account of his political opinion.8 2 Similarly, in fia-Ging Dong v. Slattery,8 3
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that a "[Chinese] citizen prosecuted for opposition to a universally applied
coercive family planning policy is not being persecuted for his political
opinion."8 4
policy in and of itself... is persecution or creates a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion 'on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.'" (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A))); see also Chen
Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1342 (rejecting opposition to population-control policy as
political opinion); Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 1995)
(upholding BIA's conclusion that petitioner did not demonstrate well-founded
fear of persecution); Jia-Ging Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(rejecting applicant's refusal to adhere to coercive family planning policy as polit-
ical opinion), affd, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996); Peng-Fei Si, 864 F. Supp. at 397. In
Peng-Fei Si, the district court held:
The BIA, in Chang, simply held that an alien, in order to establish a claim
for asylum, would have to show that forced sterilization was threatened
for some motive other than enforcement of the population control pol-
icy. It cannot be said that that standard is at odds with the plain meaning
of the asylum provisions.
Id. at 405.
81. Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1334. Mr. Chen Zhou Chai ("Chen") testified
before an immigration judge that he lived in Fujian Province, China with his wife
and two children. Id. In January 1992, government officials forced his wife to
undergo an abortion during the fifth month of her third pregnancy. Id. Further-
more, officials imposed a fine of 20,000 yuan (a sum roughly twelve times Mr.
Chen's annual salary) for the illegal birth of the couple's second child. Id. Later
that year, Mr. Chen underwent sterilization in response to continued threats by the
officials. Id. After losing his job for failing "to cooperate with the commune," Mr.
Chen booked passage on the U.S. bound Golden Venture. Id. at 1335. After the ship
ran aground off the coast of New York, the INS took Mr. Chen into custody. Id.
Before the immigration judge, Mr. Chen asserted persecution under China's
"one couple, one child" policy. Id. at 1334. Based on the BINs holding in Matter of
Chang, the immigration judge denied Mr. Chen's asylum claims, holding that
Chen's forced sterilization "resulted from [his] noncompliance with [China's]
birth control policy and not from any political dissidence." Id. at 1335.
82. Id. at 1343. The court concluded that the government imposed sanctions
on Mr. Chen for his failure to comply with the "one couple, one child" policy, not
on account of his "political opinion." Id. According to the Fourth Circuit, Mr.
Chen failed to demonstrate that the government took such actions for any reason
other than enforcing the "one couple, one child" family planning policy. Id.
("Under Matter of Chang, the [BIA] correctly found that [Mr.] Chen did not
demonstrate that he suffered persecution or had a well-grounded fear of persecu-
tion on account of political opinion.").
83. 870 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 58. Mr. Jia-Ging Dong ("Dong") and his wife lived in Fujian Prov-
ince, China. Id. at 55. Because their first born child suffered from polio, govern-
ment officials granted the Dongs an exception to the "one couple, one child"
policy and allowed them to have a second child. Id. Following the birth of their
second child, Mrs. Dong complied with an order to have an intra-uterine device
(IUD) inserted. Id. (according to Dongs, "because an IUD would have been in-
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2. Courts Rejecting Chang
Since the late 1980s, a minority of district courts have relied on the
relevant administrative pronouncements to reject Chang as the controlling
precedent.85 Like the courts upholding Chang, these courts focused their
analysis on the applicability of the administrative pronouncements sur-
rounding Chinese asylum claims.8 6
According to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, deference to the BIA's decision in
Chang was inappropriate because of the inconsistent policy regarding Chi-
nese asylum applications. 87 In Guo Chun Di, the district court disclosed
nine inconsistent administrative pronouncements regarding refugee status
under 8 U.S.C. § l101(a) (42) (A) for opponents of China's "one couple,
serted 'by force anyway'" (citations omitted)). Despite the IUD, Mrs. Dong be-
came pregnant again. Id. A local family planning chairwoman visited the couple
and "ordered Dong's wife to have an abortion." Id. The woman warned that if
Mrs. Dong failed to comply, then their home would be destroyed. Id. The couple
fled to another village. Id. While in hiding, Mr. Dong learned that officials beat
his father, destroyed some of their property and threatened to "beat [Dong] up"
and "seize his wife for abortion." Id. (alterations in original). In response, Mr.
Dong fled to the United States aboard the Golden Venture. Id.
Appearing before an immigration judge shortly after his arrival in the United
States, Mr. Dong testified that "'if I am sent back to China I will be severely pun-
ished for aiding my wife in evading the State policy [and a]dditional punishment
will certainly be imposed for leaving China."' Id. (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted). Relying on Chang, the immigration judge denied Mr. Dong's appli-
cation for asylum, concluding that opposition to the "one couple, one child" policy
does not constitute persecution. Id. at 55-56. The BIA affirmed the decision. Id.
at 56 (according to BIA, "if anything, Dong had a well-founded fear of being prose-
cuted for violating a validly administered law, not of being persecuted on account
of his political opinion").
Mr. Dong filed a petition for habeas corpus following the BIA's refusal to
grant him political asylum. Id. at 55. Like the Fourth Circuit's decision in Chen
Zhou Cha, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the claim. Id. The district court concluded that "the BIA's determina-
tion that [Mr.] Dong does not qualify for asylum because he has failed to prove
that he has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted on account of his polit-
ical opinion must be upheld, and the petition dismissed." Id. at 59.
85. Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (con-
cluding that January 1993 Final Rule effectively overruled BIA's decision in
Chang), rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996); Guo
Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D. Va. 1994) (refusing to grant defer-
ence to BIA decision in Chang because of inconsistencies in interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1994)), rev'd sub nom. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d
315 (4th Cir. 1995).
86. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 711-13 (analyzing applicability of admin-
istrative pronouncements to asylum claims); Guo Chun DI 842 F. Supp. at 862-65
(same).
87. Guo Chun Di4 842 F. Supp. at 870 (concluding that deference to Chang is
unwarranted given "[the] cacophony of administrative voices, each singing a dif-
ferent tune in a different key"). The court in Guo Chun Di began its analysis by
noting that "an agency's consistent interpretation of its statute or regulations is
entitled to judicial deference." Id. at 865 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
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one child" policy.8 8 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,8 9 the Guo Chun Di court concluded that less deference
should be accorded to an agency's inconsistent interpretations of statutory
provisions.90 Therefore, the district court rejected Chang as governing
precedent.
The same minority of district courts also concluded that the January
1993 Final Rule effectively superseded Chang, despite its failure to be pub-
lished in the Federal Register.9 1 According to the FOIA, an individual can-
not be "adversely affected" by an agency rule not published in the Federal
Register.92 In New York v. Lyng,93 however, the Second Circuit concluded
that "'the requirement for publication [in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D)] at-
taches only to matters which if not published would adversely affect a mem-
ber of the public."' 94 Relying on the above analysis, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded in Xin-
Chang Zhang v. Slattery95 that the publication requirement did not apply to
88. Id. at 866-67. For a further discussion of the administrative pronounce-
ments surrounding Chinese asylum claims, see supra notes 37-61 and accompany-
ing text.
89. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
90. Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 866 ("' [A] n agency interpretation of a rele-
vant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretations is entitled to
considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view."' (quoting Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30)); see Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct.
2151, 2161 (1993) ("[T]he consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assess-
ing the weight that position is due."). But see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency."); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d
1179, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Deference to the agency does not, however, require
us to abdicate the judicial duty carefully to 'review the record to ascertain that the
agency has made a reasoned decision .... .' (quoting Natural Resources Defense
Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
91. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 712 ("[T]he January 1993 [Final] Rule,
which does not affect petitioner adversely, became effective despite the agency's
failure to publish it in the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1)."), rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996);
Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 868 ("[T] he unpublished 1993 [Final] Rule is argua-
bly entitled to legal effect."). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires
that each agency publish "substantial rules" and "statements of policy" in the Fed-
eral Register. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1994). The FOIA
states: "Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Reg-
ister for the guidance of the public ... substantive rules of general applicability
adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations
of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency. . . ." Id.
92. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). The FOIA states: "[A] person may not in any man-
ner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be
published in the Federal Register and not so published." Id.
93. 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 354 (quoting Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir.
1970)) (emphasis added).
95. 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
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rules, such as the January 1993 Final Rule, that confer a benefit.9 6 Simi-
larly, in Guo Chun Di, the district court concluded that the January 1993
Final Rule was "arguably entitled to legal effect."97 The Guo Chun Di court
considered the following three factors in determining when unpublished
rules are legally effective: "(i) whether the unpublished interpretation af-
fects individuals' substantive rights, (ii) whether the interpretation devi-
ates from the plain meaning of the statute or regulation at issue, and (iii)
whether the interpretation limits administrative discretion."
9 8
In addition to the above arguments, these two courts construed the
phrase "political opinion" broadly, extending its coverage to include en-
forcement of the "one couple, one child" policy as persecution "on ac-
count of ... political opinion."99 For example, in Xin-Chang Zhang, the
district court held that the January 1993 Final Rule established the applica-
ble standard by which the BIA should adjudicate Chinese asylum
claims.10 0 According to the court, the unpublished January 1993 Final
Rule issued by Attorney General Barr recognized opposition to coercive
family planning policies as grounds for political asylum. 101 Therefore, be-
cause the BIA failed to apply this standard to Mr. Xin-Chang Zhang's
claim, the district court remanded the case back to the BIA for application
96. Id. at 712 ("Thus, where a rule confers a substantive benefit to a person,
an agency must comply with it, even if the rule is not published."); see Montilla v.
INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that agencies must follow their
own procedures even if they are not published); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 235 (1974) (stating that agencies must follow established procedures).
97. Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 868 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub
nom Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).
98. Id. (citing Nguyen v. United States, 824 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Although the Guo Chun Di court concluded that the rule may have some legal
effect, it also noted that "the status and legal effect of the 1993 [Final] Rule re-
mains unclear." Id.
99. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 713 (holding that under appropriate
legal standard, "one couple, one child" policy constitutes persecution on account
of political opinion); Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872-73 (concluding that opposi-
tion to coercive family planning constitutes political opinion).
100. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 712 ("The rule recognizing that fear of
persecution pursuant to a family planning policy for failure or refusal to undergo
sterilization or abortion would be grounds for asylum was signed by the Attorney
General on January 15, 1993 ....").
101. Id. For a discussion of the January 1993 Final Rule, see supra notes 53-57
and accompanying text. Mr. Xin-Chang Zhang ("Zhang") petitioned the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas
corpus. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 710. For a discussion of the facts sur-
rounding Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattey, see infra notes 117-40 and accompanying
text. Like the petitioners in Chen Zhou Chai and Jia-Ging Dong, Mr. Zhang sought
review of the BIA's decision to deny his application for political asylum in the
United States. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 710.
1996] NOTE
21
Barber: Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery: Rejecting China's Coercive Populatio
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of the correct standard.10 2 As discussed in Part III of this Note, however,
the Second Circuit subsequently reversed this decision.10 3
Similarly, in Guo Chun Di, the district court focused on two questions:
(1) whether "political opinion" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) encom-
passes opposition to China's coercive population-control policy and (2)
whether Mr. Guo Chun Di had a "well-founded fear of persecution" on
account of this political opinion.10 4 The district court answered both of
these questions in the affirmative. 10 5 First, the court noted that "there can
be little doubt that the phrase 'political opinion' encompasses an individ-
ual's views regarding procreation."' 0 6 Second, the Chinese government
responded to the couple's failure to comply with the "one couple, one
child" policy by confiscating their property and destroying their living
quarters. 10 7 According to the Guo Chun Di court, these actions clearly cre-
ated a well-founded fear of persecution based on the couple's political
opinion. 10 8 In an unpublished disposition, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district
court's decision in Guo Chun Di.t0 9
Finally, the United States Supreme Court confronted the definition of
"a well-founded fear of persecution" under the INA in INS v. Elias-
Zacarias.1 10 In this case, Mr. Elias-Zacarias, a Guatemalan, filed an applica-
tion for asylum in the United States following an encounter with armed
guerrillas who tried to coerce him and his family into joining their
group."' The Supreme Court concluded that "[t] he ordinary meaning of
102. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 713. The BIA determined that the ap-
plication of China's coercive family planning policy did not constitute "persecu-
tion within the meaning of the Act" in light of its decision in Chang. Id.
103. 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996). For a full
discussion of Xin-Chang Zhang, see notes 116-205 and accompanying text.
104. Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 871-72.
105. Id. at 872-74.
106. Id. at 872. In reaching this conclusion, the district court commented
that "the right to bear children is 'one of the basic civil rights of man."' Id. (quot-
ing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that procreation is a right "emanating from the Bill of Rights." Id. (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965)). Finally, the court noted that the fundamental right to procreate
encompassed protection against involuntary sterilization. Id. (citing Skinner, 316
U.S. at 541).
107. Id. at 873.
108. Id. The court stated that "[iit simply defies logic to contend that these
governmental actions did not amount to persecution." Id.
109. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).
110. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
111. Id. at 479-80. According to testimony given before an immigration
judge, armed guerrillas came to the home of the Elias-Zacarias family and asked
them to join their group. Id. at 479. After the family refused, the guerrillas sug-
gested that they reconsider and threatened to return. Id. Fearing retaliation by
the guerrillas, Mr. Elias-Zacarias fled to the United States. Id. at 480. Mr. Elias-
Zacarias left Guatemala because, according to the immigration judge, "he was
afraid that the guerrillas would return." Id. The immigration judge reviewing his
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the phrase 'persecution on account of... political opinion' ... is persecu-
tion on account of the victim's opinion, not the persecutor's."'112 Accord-
ing to the Court, Mr. Elias-Zacarias could not assert opposition to the
guerillas' political motives as "persecution on account of... political opin-
ion" under the INA.' 13 Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision and denied the petitioner's request for asylum.1 14
Against this backdrop, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit confronted the issue of asylum for a Chinese alien in the case
of Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery.' 15 In reaching its decision to deny the re-
spondent's application for asylum, the Second Circuit scrutinized each of
the administrative pronouncements surrounding this issue, as well as the
correctness of the BIA's decision in Matter of Chang. 16
III. XIN-CHANG ZHANG V. SLA 7TERY
A. Factual Background
Mr. Xin-Chang Zhang ("Zhang") and his wife are natives of Fujian
Province in the People's Republic of China.117 One month after the birth
of their first child in October 1991, government officials approached Mr.
Zhang and demanded that his wife comply with the country's "one couple,
one child" policy through the insertion of an intra-uterine device." 8
Although she agreed, the officials returned shordy thereafter and de-
manded that either Mr. Zhang or his wife undergo sterilization surgery." 9
Mr. Zhang protested, claiming that his wife was too ill to undergo the op-
application denied Mr. Elias-Zacarias asylum on the ground that he "failed to
demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion." Id. The BIA dismissed his appeal. Id.
In Elias-Zacarias, the INS appealed a ruling of the Ninth Circuit that coercion
to join the Guatemalan guerilla group constituted persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, coercion to join a nongovern-
mental group constitutes persecution on account of political opinion. Id.
112. Id. at 482.
113. Id. ("[T]he mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying
the guerillas' forced recruitment is inadequate to establish... the proposition that
Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion, as [the INA]
requires.").
114. Id. at 484.
115. 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
116. For a further discussion of the relevant administrative pronouncements,
see supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the BIA's
decision in Matter of Chang, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
117. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741.
118. Id. For a further discussion of China's "one couple, one child" policy,
see supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
119. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741; see also Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 859
F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that Mr. Zhang stated he was "singled-
out" to undergo sterilization because of disagreement with powerful neighbor),
rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
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eration.12 0 In response, the officials threatened the couple with fines and
forced sterilization if they refused to comply with their demands.12 ' Ac-
cording to Mr. Zhang, he and his wife refused to submit, later protesting
that "they wished to have more children because they disagreed with
China's 'one child' policy and because they believed people should be free
to have as many children as they wish. '122
Fearing that the Chinese government would subject one of them to
forced sterilization, both Mr. Zhang and his wife went into hiding for
nearly six months. 123 While in hiding, Mr. Zhang made arrangements to
be smuggled to the United States aboard the Golden Venture.12 4 In Febru-
ary 1993, the ship departed from Fujian Province with Mr. Zhang and
more than 300 other Chinese nationals in its holds. 12 5
In the early morning hours ofJune 6, 1993, after nearly three months
at sea, the Golden Venture struck a sandbar off the coast of Queens, New
York. 126 With helicopters flying overhead and rescue boats in the water,
Mr. Zhang climbed down one of the ship's ladders into the water and
swam ashore. 127 After "walk [ing] a few steps and then collaps[ing] to the
ground," law enforcement officials took Mr. Zhang into custody.128 While
in the custody of the INS, Mr. Zhang learned from relatives in China that
if he returned, he would be imprisoned for two years and incur a fine of
twenty to thirty thousand yuan (an amount roughly twelve times his an-
nual salary) for noncompliance with China's population-control policy.' 29
120. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741. Chinese nationals often claim illness to
avoid sterilization operations. According to Mr. Zhang, his wife's health was "'not
very good' because she had previously undergone throat surgery." Appellant's
Brief at 7, Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-6258).
121. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 710. According to Mr. Zhang, pressure
to undergo sterilization surgery is generally not applied until a couple becomes
pregnant with a second child. Id. Mr. Zhang believes, however, that a powerful
neighbor singled him out following a quarrel. Id.
122. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741.
123. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 710. During this period, Mr. Zhang
separated from his wife and son and fled to the city of Fuzhou, where he worked
for approximately six months. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741.
124. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741. The smugglers required an initial de-
posit of $5,000 with a balance of $25,000 due sometime after the ship's arrival in
the United States. Id. For a discussion of the voyage and the conditions aboard
the ship, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
125. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 741-42. For a further discussion of the
number of passengers aboard the Golden Venture, see supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
126. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742. For a further discussion of the voyage
of the Golden Venture, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
127. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 711. For a further discussion of the
voyage of the Golden Venture, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
128. Xin-Change Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 711.
129. Appellee's Brief at 6, Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1995) (No. 94-6258). Mr. Zhang earned an annual salary of approximately 2,400
yuan. Id.
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The INS charged Mr. Zhang with "being excludable from the United
States pursuant to sections 212(a) (7) (A) (i) (I), (B) (i) (I), and (B) (i) (II) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952."' 130 On July 16, 1993, Mr.
Zhang submitted an application to an immigration judge for asylum and
withholding of return.1 3 1 He claimed that he had a "well-founded fear"
that, if returned to China, government officials would persecute him
under the "one couple, one child" policy.132 The immigration judge de-
nied the applications, concluding that Mr. Zhang failed to establish "a
well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of [the] asylum
130. Appellant's Brief at 4, Xin-Chang Zhang (No. 94-6258). Section
212(a) (7) (A) (i) (I) of the INA states:
[A]ny immigrant at the time of application for admission ... who is not
in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border
crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by
this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel doc-
ument, or document of identity and nationality if such document is re-
quired under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under
section 1181(a) of this title . . . is excludable.
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (7) (A) (i) (I) (1994). Section (B)(i)(I) of the INA states:
Any nonimmigrant who.., is not in possession of a passport valid for a
minimum of six months from the date of the expiration of the initial
period of the alien's admission or contemplated initial period of stay au-
thorizing the alien to return to the country from which the alien came or
to proceed to and enter some other country during such period . . . is
excludable.
Id. § 1182 (B) (i) (I). Finally, section (B) (i) (II) of the INA states: "Any nonimmi-
grant who.., is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing
identification card at the time of application for admission, is excludable." Id.
§ 1182 (B) (i) (II). On June 30, 1993, Mr. Zhang appeared before a New York Im-
migration Judge to challenge the INS exclusion proceedings. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55
F.3d at 742. Mr. Zhang's attorney argued that the INS had improperly placed Mr.
Zhang in exclusion instead of deportation proceedings because Mr. Zhang had
indeed effected "entry" into the United States. Lin, supra note 21, at 232. Denying
Mr. Zhang's motion for deportation proceedings, the Judge concluded that exclu-
sion proceedings were proper because Mr. Zhang failed to effect "entry" into the
United States. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742. The United States Code defines
"entry" as: "any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or
place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (13). Furthermore, according to the BIA, entry involves: "(1) a crossing
into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e. physical presence; (2) (a) an
inspection and admission by an immigration officer or (b) actual and intentional
evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point; and (3) freedom from offi-
cial restraint." Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 752 (citing Correa v. Thornburgh, 901
F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990)).
131. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742.
132. Id. Mr. Zhang believed that if he returned to China, officials would force
him to undergo a sterilization procedure. Id. In addition to sterilization, Mr.
Zhang claimed that he would be jailed and fined. Lin, supra note 21, at 233.
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laws." 133 Mr. Zhang appealed the decision to the BIA. 3 4 Relying on
Chang, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision to refuse Mr.
Zhang's applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. 13 5
Subsequently, on March 25, 1994, Mr. Zhang filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.' 3 6 The district court remanded the case to the BIA,
concluding that the January 1993 Final Rule superseded the Chang stan-
dard.13 7 Therefore, the district court held that the BIA applied the wrong
standard when it considered Mr. Zhang's applications for asylum and with-
holding of return.13 8
The INS appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.' 3 9 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
holding and remanded the judgment back to the district court.' 40 The
Second Circuit concluded that: (i) no executive or legislative pronounce-
ment, including the January 1993 Final Rule, overruled or superseded the
BIA's decision in Chang and (ii) fear of persecution under China's coer-
cive family planning policy did not qualify Mr. Zhang for refugee status
under the INA.' 4 1
133. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742 (alterations in original) (citations omit-
ted). In rejecting Mr. Zhang's applications, the immigration judge applied the
BIA's decision in Chang. Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271
(1996). According to the immigration judge, "the implementation of the one-
couple, one-child policy in and of itself even to the extent that involuntary steriliza-
tions may occur is [not] persecution [nor does it] create[ ] a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
134. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742.
135. Id. The BIA concluded that "the immigration judge's decision was cor-
rect, and we adopt as our own his findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
asylum issue." Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 711. For a further discussion of
Chang, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
136. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 742-43.
137. Id. at 743. According to the district court, "the January 1993 [Final]
Rule, which does not affect petitioner adversely, became effective despite the
agency's failure to publish it in the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1)." Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 712. The district court also con-
cluded that the BIA incorrectly placed the burden on the petitioner to prove that
he effected entry into the United States. Id. at 715.
138. Xin-Chang Zhang, 859 F. Supp. at 713. According to the district court,
the BIA's application of the Chang standard was incorrect. Id.
139. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 743. For a further discussion of the Second
Circuit's reasoning in reversing the holding of the district court, see infra notes
142-78 and accompanying text.
140. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 756.
141. Id. at 752. On July 3, 1995, Appellee Xin-Chang Zhang filed a petition
for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing in banc.
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In Xin-Chang Zhang, the Second Circuit considered whether China's
"one couple, one child" policy served as a legitimate basis for granting
asylum under the INA. 14 2 The court began its inquiry with an examina-
tion of the administrative pronouncements concerning Chinese asylum
claims and their effect on the BIA's decision in Chang.143 The court then
considered whether the BIA's ruling in Chang was consistent with the
INA.144
The court began its analysis of the relevant administrative pronounce-
ments by rejecting Mr. Zhang's argument that the January 1990 Interim
Rule "went into effect in January 1990 and has never been expressly re-
pealed."145 Instead, the court declared the administrative rule invalid be-
cause it failed to undergo a period of notice and comment in the Federal
Register as required by the APA.146 Furthermore, the court determined
142. Id. at 743. For a further discussion of China's "one couple, one child"
policy in the context of governing asylum law, see supra notes 20-115 and accompa-
nying text.
143. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 743 (according to Second Circuit, "our ini-
tial inquiry is... whether Chang is still good law"). For a further discussion of the
administrative pronouncements and their effect on Chang, see supra notes 37-61.
144. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 743. For a further discussion of the BIA's
decision in Chang, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
145. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 744. For a further discussion of the January
1990 Interim Rule and subsequent rules, see supra notes 47-57.
146. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 744. According to the Second Circuit, the
"January 1990 [I]nterim [R]ule was never properly promulgated as a legislative
rule under the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA') and that, even if it had been
properly promulgated, it would have been repealed in June 1990 by the publica-
tion of subsequent regulations." Id.
The court noted that the APA waives the notice and comment requirement if
the rule falls into one of the following exceptions: foreign affairs, interpretive rul-
ings or good cause. Id. The APA excepts three categories of rules from the notice
and comment requirement:
This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of
the United States .... Except when notice or hearing is required by
statute, this subsection does not apply... to interpretive rules, general
statements of policy.., or when the agency for good cause finds ... that
notice and public procedure thereon are impractical, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.
5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(B) (1994).
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit analyzed each of these excep-
tions. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 744-47. First, the court considered the foreign
affairs exception in light of the fact that numerous courts have applied this excep-
tion to immigration cases. Id. at 744 (citing Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.
1982); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court determined, however, that the foreign af-
fairs exception did not apply because "[there [were] no 'definitely undesirable
international consequences' that would have resulted from following standard
rule-making procedure in this case." Id. The court admitted that it was "not in a
19961 NOTE 547
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that even if the January 1990 Interim Rule had been properly promul-
gated, the July 1990 Final Rule effectively repealed the interim rule.' 47
According to the court, the July 1990 Final Rule superseded the January
1990 Interim Rule because it substantially rewrote the asylum sections of
the regulations without making any reference to the previous rule. 148
Therefore, the Second Circuit rejected Mr. Zhang's argument that the
January 1990 Interim Rule effectively overruled Chang and established fear
of persecution under China's "one couple, one child" policy as a basis for
asylum.
Next, the court concluded that Executive Order 12,711, issued by
President Bush, was also ineffective in overruling the BIA's decision in
Chang.149 The court noted: "Generally, there is no private right of action
to enforce obligations imposed on executive branch officials by executive
orders."150 According to the court, the executive order merely directed
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to take steps to further the
asylum claims of Chinese aliens fleeing the "one couple, one child" pol-
good position to gauge the sensitivities of foreign nations, or to consider any but
the most obvious foreign policy risks." Id. at 745. The court, however, saw no
"obvious" concerns in this case. Id.
Second, the court concluded that the January 1990 Interim Rule was "legisla-
tive in character and could not have qualified for the interpretive exception to
[section] 553's notice and comment requirement." Id. at 746. According to the
court, the rule "create[d] a new basis on which aliens may be granted refugee
status;" and therefore, the rule was legislative instead of interpretive in character.
Id. According to the Second Circuit, "'[a] rule is interpretive ... if it attempts to
clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law, policy, or practice."' Id.
at 745 (quoting United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted)).
Finally, the court concluded that there was no "good cause" to exclude the
rule from the notice and comment period. Id. at 746-47. According to the court,
"[i]t would not have been 'impracticable' to subject the January 1990 [1]nterim
[R]ule to notice and comment .... Nor was notice and comment 'unnecessary':
the rule could hardly be classified as 'a minor or merely technical amendment."'
Id. at 747 (quoting National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377, 385
(2d Cir. 1978)).
147. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 744 (concluding that publication of subse-
quent regulations repealed January 1990 Interim Rule).
148. Id. at 747. The court rejected Mr. Zhang's argument that a rule cannot
be repealed without being subjected to the same notice and comment period re-
quired to properly promulgate a new rule. Id. Therefore, according to Mr. Zhang,
"this silent repeal of the January 1990 interim rule would itself have violated the
notice and comment provisions of the APA." Id.
149. Id. at 747-48. For a further discussion of Executive Order 12,711, see
supra notes 48, 58, 59 and accompanying text.
150. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 747 (quoting Facchiano Constr. Co. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that executive order establishing procedure to screen immigrants on high seas was
not intended "to allow the interdictees to initiate judicial review of their cases");
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that executive
order was merely managerial tool that did not create private right of action).
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icy. 151 The court held that the executive order did not create a private
right of action enforceable against officials of the executive branch. 152
Therefore, like the January 1990 Interim Rule, Executive Order 12,711 did
not supersede the BIA's decision in Chang.
Finally, the Second Circuit concluded that the January 1993 Final
Rule was not successfully promulgated and therefore had no effect on
Chang.t5 3 The court determined that this rule was unenforceable because
it was never published in the Federal Register.154 To reach this conclusion,
the court focused primarily on the text of the rule itself.155 The rule con-
tained the following indication as to its date of effectiveness: "EFFECTIVE
DATE: [Insert date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.]"1 5 6 Ac-
cording to the court, because it was never published in the Federal Register,
the rule never became effective. 15 7 Therefore, like the other administra-
tive pronouncements issued during the Bush administration, the January
1993 Final Rule failed to overturn the BIA's ruling in Chang.158
After concluding that "Chang is still good law," 15 9 the Second Circuit
considered whether the BIA's ruling in Changa6° was "based on a permissi-
151. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 748.
152. Id. According to the Second Circuit, "Executive Orders cannot be en-
forced privately unless they were intended by the executive to create a private right
of action." Id. (citing Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234
(8th Cir. 1975); Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1974)).
153. Id. at 748-49.
154. Id. at 749. In its analysis of this rule, the court conceded that "a regula-
tion need not necessarily be published in order to be enforced against the govern-
ment." Id. at 748. In New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second
Circuit held that the publication requirement established by the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, applies only to rules that would "adversely affect a member of the
public." Id. at 354 (discussing Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)
(1994)). For a further discussion of New York v. Lyng, see supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
Applying this rationale to the January 1993 Final Rule, the Second Circuit in
Xin-Chang Zhang determined that the rule did not need to be published because
nonpublication would not "adversely affect a member of the public." Xin-Chang
Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749. The court concluded, however, that the rule must first
become effective before it can bind anyone. Id.
155. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id. For a further discussion of the administrative pronouncements made
by the Bush administration, see supra notes 37-56.
159. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 743.
160. Id. at 749-52. In Chang, the BIA concluded:
We cannot find that implementation of the "one couple, one child" pol-
icy in and of itself, even to the extent that involuntary sterilizations may
occur, is persecution or creates a well-founded fear of persecution "on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."
Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, *10-11 (BIA May 12,
1989) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1982)). For a further discussion of
Chang, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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ble construction of the [INAI."161 The court began its analysis of Changby
noting that U.S. immigration laws do not specifically address whether
aliens subjected to a coercive family planning policy qualify for refugee
status.162 The court noted that as long as the BIA made a "'reasoned deci-
sion,"'16 3 it was "'not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."' 16 4 The court noted, however, that an agency must provide con-
sistent interpretations of a regulation before courts defer to the agency's
interpretation of that regulation. 165 The court quoted INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca,166 in which the United States Supreme Court stated that "an agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's ear-
lier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consist-
ently held agency view."'16 7 The Second Circuit rejected Mr. Zhang's
argument that the various administrative pronouncements issued by the
Bush administration created inconsistency in asylum policy.168 In refer-
ence to the Attorney General's rules and President Bush's executive order,
the court concluded that "the agency has repeatedly been on the verge of
receiving new policy; but throughout the BIA has followed its holding in
Chang every time it has been asked to consider [China's] 'one child' is-
sue."169 Through this statement, the court reasserted its belief that the
161. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)); see also INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (concluding that when there are gaps in
legislation or ambiguity, "courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to
which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory
program").
162. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749. The court stated that if Congress specif-
ically addressed the question, then "the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. (quoting Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984)).
163. Id. at 750 (quoting American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179,
1187 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
164. Id. (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971)).
165. Id. According to the court, "'the consistency of an agency's position is a
factor in assessing the weight that position is due."' Id. (quoting Good Samaritan
Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (1993)).
166. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
167. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 750 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446
n.30).
168. Id. at 750-51. In Guo Chun Di v. Carroll the court shared a similar view,
characterizing this area of asylum law as "an administrative cacophony undeserving
of judicial deference." 842 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub nom Guo
Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).
169. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 750. The Second Circuit quoted the opinion
from another Golden Venture case, in which Judge Mukasey said:
The policy consistently adhered to by the BIA and applied to aliens seek-
ing asylum based on the "one child" rule is the policy articulated in
Chang. Under the circumstances presented here, therefore, all that the
various pronouncements [by the President and the Attorneys General]
... suggest is that the legislative and executive branches studiously ab-
stained from overruling Chang.
Vol. 41: p. 521
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/4
1996]
administrative pronouncements issued during the Bush administration
failed to effectively overrule Chang. Therefore, the court felt justified in
giving deference to the BIA's decision. 170
In addition to the above conclusions, the Second Circuit determined
that Mr. Zhang failed to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution"
because of his political opinion.17 1 In reaching this conclusion, the court
drew a distinction between persecution on account of an individual's polit-
ical opinion and punishment for disobeying the law. 172 According to the
court, "[INS v. Elias-Zacarias] teaches that an applicant for refugee status
must establish a fear of reprisal that is different in kind from a desire to
avoid the exactions (however harsh) that a foreign government may place
upon its citizens. 1 73 In this case, Mr. Zhang feared the repercussions of
disobeying China's "one couple, one child" policy.1 74 According to the
court, the "one couple, one child" policy is a "facially neutral Chinese law"
applicable to all Chinese nationals. 175 Therefore, the court determined
that Mr. Zhang did not face persecution in China on account of his polit-
ical opinion. 176
In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the decision of the district court to grant Mr. Zhang asylum. 177
The Second Circuit denied Mr. Zhang's application for three primary rea-
sons: (i) the failure of administrative pronouncements to overrule or su-
persede the BLA's decision in Chang, (ii) justifiable deference to the
conclusion reached in Chang that implementation of the "one couple, one
child" policy is not persecutive and does not create a "well-founded fear of
persecution" on account of an individual's political opinion; and (iii) Mr.
Zhang failed to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" based on
his political opinion.178
Id. at 751 (quoting Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)) (altera-
tions in original).
170. Id.
171. Id. For a further discussion of persecution on account of political opin-
ion, see supra notes 80-84, 99-114 and accompanying text.
172. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 751.
173. Id. (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1992)). For a fur-
ther discussion of the facts in 1NS v. Elias-Zacarias, see supra notes 110-14 and ac-
companying text.
174. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 751.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 752 ("The BIA properly analyzed (and rejected) [Mr.] Zhang's
claim for refugee status based on his fear of being persecuted under China's ['one
couple, one child'] policy.").
177. Id. at 756.
178. Id. at 743-52. A fourth reason, not discussed in this Note, was Mr.
Zhang's failure to effectuate entry into the United States which would have made
him subject to deportation rather than exclusion proceedings. Id. at 752-56.
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B. Critical Analysis
In Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, the Second Circuit rejected China's co-
ercive family planning policy as grounds for political asylum in the United
States. 179 As a result, the Second Circuit joined the Fourth and Fifth Cir-
cuits and nine district courts in upholding the BIA's decision in Chang.180
In reaching its decision, however, the Second Circuit hastily rejected a
vast number of administrative and regulatory pronouncements specifically
intended to grant asylum to opponents of China's coercive population-
control policy.181 In particular, the court's analysis overlooked several im-
portant factors suggesting that the January 1990 Interim Rule and the Jan-
uary 1993 Final Rule effectively overruled Chang.
First, the Second Circuit failed to recognize that the July 1990 Final
Rule did not meet the established requirements for revocation of theJanu-
ary 1990 Interim Rule. 182 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 183 the United States
Supreme Court held that "an agency changing its course by rescinding a
rule is obligated to provide a reasoned analysis for the change." 184 The
Attorney General issued the July 1990 Final Rule with no "reasoned analy-
sis" or even mention of the pro-asylum language of the January 1990 In-
179. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 752 ("The BIA properly analyzed (and re-jected) Zhang's claim for refugee status based on his fear of being persecuted
under China's 'one child' policy."). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's rea-
soning in reversing the holding of the district court, see supra notes 142-78 and
accompanying text.
180. Dai Xiu Ying v. Caplinger, Nos. CIV.A.94-2190, 94-2191, 94-2193, 94-
2194, 94-2195, 94-2197, 94-2198, 94-2199, 94-2201, 94-2202, 94-2203, 94-3407, 1995
WL 143830, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) (upholding BIA's decision in Chang as
"good law"); accord Li Zhi Guan v. Carroll, 60 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1995) (same);
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Chang Lian
Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Shang Ming Wang v. Slattery,
877 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Jia-Ging Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp.
53 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same), af/'d, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996); Shon Qi Lan v. Waters,
869 F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Jia-Hu Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp.
1474 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Chen Chuan Fei v. Carroll, 866 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (same); Peng-Fei Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same);
Xiu Qin Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Yang Cheng
Huan v. Carroll, 852 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same), aff'd, 70 F.3d 114 (4th
Cir. 1995); see Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltegen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995) ("Until further legislative action is taken, Chang remains
Board law, consistent with the INA."). For a discussion of why a majority of courts
give deference to Chang, see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the court's analysis concerning these administrative
and regulatory pronouncements, see supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
182. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 483-86.
183. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
184. Id. at 42. Also, in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), the D.C. Circuit concluded that administrative agencies cannot repeal
by omission, but rather must "indicat[e] that prior policies and standards are be-
ing deliberately changed, not casually ignored." Id. at 852.
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terim Rule.18 5 Therefore, the January 1990 Interim Rule remained in
effect until the Attorney General promulgated the January 1993 Final
Rule.
Furthermore, in assessing the validity of the January 1990 Interim
Rule, the Second Circuit unduly dismissed the response of the Depart-
ment ofJustice and the INS to theJuly 1990 Final Rule. 18 6 After the Attor-
ney General issued the July 1990 Final Rule, which failed to address
Chinese asylum claims, the Appellate Counsel of the INS stated unequivo-
cally that the January 1990 Interim Rule "has not been amended or re-
pealed" and that coercive family planning policies "[do] constitute
persecution on account of political opinion."' 87 Clearly, the INS believed
that the effect of the January 1990 Interim Rule extended beyond promul-
gation of the July 1990 Final Rule.'
8 8
Second, the January 1993 Final Rule became effective even though it
was not published in the Federal Register.'89 In Montilla v. INS,19 0 the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that "'[w]here the rights of individuals are af-
fected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures...'
even though the procedural requirement has not yet been published in
the federal register."'191 Furthermore, the FOIA's publication require-
ment applies only to rules that adversely affect members of the public. 192
Because the January 1993 Final Rule only benefits asylum applicants and
not members of the American public, the publication requirement does
185. Xiu Qin Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 817 ("The July 1990 Final Rule not only
made no mention of the January 1990 Interim Rule, but it also changed sections of
the C.F.R .... so that the resulting regulations concerning asylum procedures
made no mention of coercive family planning practices.").
186. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 485 (stating that "theJuly 1990 Final Rule was
not intended to revoke the January 1990 Interim Rule").
187. Memorandum from David M. Dixon, Appellate Counsel, INS, to David
B. Holmes, Chief Attorney Examiner, BIA (Apr. 11, 1991), reprinted in Appellee's
Brief at A2, Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-6258).
188. Appellee's Brief at 21, Xin-Chang Zhang (No. 94-6258). For example, in a
memorandum from the Appellate Counsel of the INS to the Chief Examiner Attor-
ney of the BIA, dated April 11, 1991, David Dixon stated: "The regulation set out
in 8 C.F.R. 208.5, was published January 29, 1990, as an interim regulation....
Although this section did not appear in the recent publication of asylum regula-
tions, it has not been amended or repealed.... The policy contained in the in-
terim regulation remains the policy of the service." Memorandum from David M.
Dixon, supra note 187.
189. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 483 (suggesting that withdrawal of January
1993 Final Rule from publication "had no effect on the rule's applicability to immi-
gration judges and the BIA").
190. 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
191. Id. at 167 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974)) (conclud-
ing that agency must follow its own procedures) (alterations in original).
192. New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that
"'the requirement for publication attaches only to matters which if not published
would adversely affect a member of the public"' (quoting Hogg v. United States,
428 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1970))).
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not apply. Therefore, the January 1993 Final Rule became effective even
though it was not published in the Federal Register.
In addition to the above arguments, the Second Circuit failed to rec-
ognize procreation as a fundamental human right that is entitled to pro-
tection against persecution. 193 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,19 4 the United
States Supreme Court held that procreation was "one of the basic civil
rights of man" and that "[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, farreaching and devastating effects."'195 Arguably, any effort to re-
strict a "fundamental right" qualifies as persecution.1 9 6 Therefore, forced
abortions and sterilizations in furtherance of China's coercive family plan-
ning policy constitute "persecution on account of ... political opinion"
under the INA. Granted, the fundamental right of procreation and the
prohibition against forced sterilization in Skinner apply only to state action
by the United States against either United States citizens or people enti-
tled to constitutional protections within the United States. The world
community, however, recognizes procreation as a fundamental right.
Therefore, it is incumbant upon the United States as a world leader to
promote and protect this valued interest whenever possible.
Finally, the BIA's decision in Chang is not entitled to deference be-
cause Chang is factually distinct from Xin-Chang Zhang and other subse-
quent Chinese asylum cases.197 In his application for asylum, Mr. Zhang
asserted "a well-founded fear that if returned to China he would be perse-
cuted by being subjected to a sterilization procedure in accordance with
[China's] 'one child' policy."1 98 In contrast, Mr. Chang merely asserted
opposition to China's "Communist domination."'199 Thus, the BIA consid-
193. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 482-83 (stating that international law and
United States court decisions recognize procreation as fundamental right).
194. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
195. Id. at 541 (declaring Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act un-
constitutional); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973) (discussing pro-
creation as fundamental right).
196. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (concluding that sterilization forever deprives
individuals of basic liberty); see also Lin, supra note 21, at 242 ("Forced sterilization
and abortion no doubt contravene universally recognized fundamental rights, and
cannot be excused simply because the government oppresses all under a nation-
wide regime of coercive family planning." (citing Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, arts. 12, 16(3), U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948))).
197. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 481-82.
198. Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
199. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 481-82 n.104. In Guo Chun Di v. Carrol4 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted that:
[Mr. Chang's] asylum application merely indicated that petitioner was an
anti-Communist who fled PRC "because of Communist domination."
The petitioner in Chang further indicated that neither he nor his family
had been mistreated, and that the family had not suffered from govern-
ment policy any more than the rest of the citizens of the PRC .... Based
on these facts, the BIA in Chang stated that the mere implementation of the
"one couple, one child" policy was not "on its face persecutive."
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ered a much broader asylum claim in Chang than the claim considered by
the Second Circuit in Xin-Chang Zhang.
Furthermore, the BIA based its conclusion in Chang on the inaccurate
premise that Chinese officials employed only nonviolent techniques to en-
force the "one couple, one child" policy.200 In Chang, the BIA concluded
that "the one-child policy [was] not routinely enforced by mandatory ster-
ilization and abortion." °2 0 ' Instead, the BIA stated that Chinese officials
"used only economic incentives and birth control education but forbid [ I]
coercive techniques. °20 2 Since Chang, far more coercive and often horrific
enforcement techniques have come to light that clearly qualify as persecu-
tion under the INA.203 Because the BIA based its decision on dissimilar
facts and an incomplete understanding of China's enforcement tech-
niques, Changis no longer entitled to deference.2 0 4 Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit improperly relied on Chang and misinterpreted the relevant
administrative actions in deciding to deny Mr. Zhang's asylum request.
Id. (citing Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 874 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995)).
200. Id. at 482. In Chang, the BIA dealt with facts substantially different from
those in subsequent Chinese asylum cases. Id.
201. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107 BIA LEXIS 13, *12 (BIA May 12,
1989).
202. Crabbs, supra note 10, at 251 n.8 (citing E. Tobin Shiers, Coercive Popula-
tion Control Policies: An Illustration of the Need for a Conscientious Objector Provision for
Asylum Seekers, 13 IMMIGR. & NATIONALrrY L. REv. 476, 476-77 (1991)). In support
of its belief that "the one-child policy is not routinely enforced by mandatory steril-
ization," the BIA cited the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987 which
states that 48.8% of the births in China during 1986 "were second, third, or later
births." Chang, 1989 BIA LEXIS 13, at *12 (citing DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SUBMIT-
TED TO SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELA-
TIONS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1987, at 665 (Comm. Print 1988)).
203. See Lin, supra note 21, at 242 ("[T]here exists substantial evidence that
punishment for violation of the ['one couple, one child'] policy is disproportion-
ately severe."). Although the Chinese government continues to deny the use of
coercive techniques, atrocities in the name of population-control are uncontro-
verted. See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1335 (according to
court, "[t]he immigration judge accepted as credible [Mr.] Chen's testimony re-
garding his refusal to comply with the birth control policy and the sanctions ap-
plied by the government for his noncompliance"); Jia-Ging Dong v. Slattery, 870
F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (according to court, immigration judge found Mr.
Dong's testimony regarding coercion to be "credible in every respect"), affd, 84
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996); see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SuaMrrTED TO SENATE COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 104TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 561 (Comm.
Print 1995) (acknowledging that forced sterilizations and abortions do take place).
204. See Lin, supra note 21, at 242 ("[E]vidence [of disproportionally severe
punishment for noncompliance with the 'one couple, one child' policy] presents
sufficient justification for the court to discard Matter of Chang and to adopt instead
an approach to adjudicating [Chinese] asylum claims more consistent with United
States asylum law and international human rights law.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Like Mr. Zhang, most of the immigrants aboard the Golden Venture
came to the United States seeking asylum from China's coercive family
planning policy.2 0 5 Based on the number of administrative pronounce-
ments surrounding this issue, there seems to be a clear desire among ad-
ministrators and legislators to grant asylum to Chinese aliens facing
persecution under China's "one couple, one child" policy.20 6 Since 1988,
however, they have failed to enunciate a clear and effective asylum
policy.2
0 7
Following Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattey, this area of asylum law stands at
a crossroad. On the one hand, the Second Circuit's decision in Xin-Chang
Zhang may drone the "administrative cacophony" surrounding China's co-
ercive population-control policies by establishing a clear-cut precedent
against the asylum claims. In such a capacity, the case will bolster the ar-
gument proffered by several circuits that the BIA's holding in Matter of
Chang remains "good law." 208 Therefore, despite the inexcusable human
rights atrocities suffered by Chinese families at the hands of their govern-
ment, immigration judges and the BIA will continue to deny applications
for asylum based on coercive population-control policies. For Chinese im-
migrants like Mr. Zhang, the quest for freedom will end in defeat.
On the other hand, the court's decision in Zhang may serve to in-
crease the volume of the "administrative cacophony" surrounding this is-
sue. The decision to uphold the BIA's ruling in Chang may spur Congress
to pass legislation once again requiring the INS and BIA to extend "care-
ful consideration" to applicants fleeing China's "one couple, one child
policy."20 9 In addition, the decision may again compel the executive
branch to take action to ensure that Chinese immigrants fleeing the op-
205. For a discussion of the reason why the Chinese immigrants claim they
fled China, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the numerous administrative pronouncements sur-
rounding Chinese asylum claims, see supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
207. See Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1342 ("Although Congress tried to over-
rule Matter of Changby statute, and several former Attorney Generals by regulation,
these attempts have all failed."); Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379, 380 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("While Petitioners have demonstrated various proposals to change the
criteria defined in Matter of Chang... for use in Chinese forced abortion/forced
sterilization asylum claims, those proposals have unfortunately never been
implemented.").
208. For a discussion of the courts adopting Chang as "good law," see supra
notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
209. In Dai Xiu Ying v. Caplinger, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana stated: "Whether these policies are such that the immi-
gration laws should be amended to provide temporary or permanent relief from
deportation to all individuals who face the possibility of forced sterilization as part
of a country's population control program is a matter for Congress to resolve legisla-
tively." Nos. CIV.A.94-2190, 94-2191, 94-2193, 94-2194, 94-2195, 94-2197, 94-2198,
94-2199, 94-2201, 94-2202, 94-2203, 94-3407, 1995 WL 143830, at *3-4 (E.D. La.
Apr. 25, 1995) (emphasis added).
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pressive policy are given special consideration by asylum adjudicators.2 10
Either way, Mr. Zhang'sjourney to freedom will continue until a clear and
effective policy is properly promulgated by any branch of the United States
federal government.
Kevin S. Barber
210. Under the Clinton administration, executive action to further the Chi-
nese asylum claims based on the "one couple, one child" policy seems unlikely.
On October 24, 1995, President Clinton met with Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin
to try to improve the poor relationship between the United States and China. Reu-
ter, U.S. Sees Modest Gains from Clinton-iang Summit (last modified Oct. 24, 1995)
<http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/current/news/stories/uschina>. According
to Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, "both Presidents sought to focus on a
framework for improving U.S.-Chinese ties, which are badly frayed over such issues
as Taiwan, human rights, arms transfers and trade." Id. Furthermore, White
House spokesman Mike McCurry said that "[the administration has] begun a pro-
cess that will lead to a series of dialogues that can help improve the opportunity for
comprehensive engagement with China." Id. Given the administration's apparent
efforts to improve the United States-China relationship, it seems unlikely that Pres-
ident Clinton would take steps to grant Chinese asylum claims based on opposition
to China's "one couple, one child" population control policy.
37
Barber: Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery: Rejecting China's Coercive Populatio
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/4
